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ABSTRACT: After the 2016 election of Donald Trump, many 
commentators latched on to the accusations Rorty levels 
at the American Left in Achieving Our Country. Rorty 
foresaw, they claimed, that the Left's preoccupation 
with cultural politics and neglect of class politics would 
lead to the election of a "strongman" who would take 
advantage of and exploit a rise in populist sentiment. 
In this paper, I generally agree with these readings of 
Rorty; he does think that the American Left has made 
the mistake of putting class on the political backburner. 
However, I suggest that this position follows from his 
view that economic security is vital for solidarity. 
Because economic security is under increasing threat in 
contemporary America, so too is solidarity. If greater 
solidarity is a goal of liberal democracy, then class 
politics, aimed at ending selfishness, ought to be as 
much a priority for the American Left as is cultural 
politics, aimed at ending sadism.  
 






In Achieving Our Country, Richard Rorty accuses the 
American Left of many failings. Some of these accusa-
tions became fodder for much of the commentary that 
accompanied the passage from Achieving Our Country 
that went viral after the election of Donald Trump to the 
American Presidency. Some commentators latched onto 
his claim that the contemporary American Left was (and 
continues to be) mistaken in its focus on ending sadism 
rather than selfishness. That is, Rorty’s claims were – if 
not explicitly, then certainly implicitly – marshaled in 
support of arguments against politics that prioritize 
issues of identity and culture.1 On this reading, the Left’s 
                                                 
1 As David Rondel puts it, “a majority of post-election 
commentators have tended to read Achieving Our 
Country as, among other things, an admonishment of so-
called ‘identity politics’ in favor of an ‘Old Left” politics 
of redistribution and economic justice” (Rondel 2018, 2). 
Of course, the skill with which Rorty’s arguments were 
handled varied greatly, and according to the purposes of 
the commentators. For a sample of these commentaries, 
see Bérubé, 2016; Friedersdorf, 2017; Helmore 2016; 
mistake in and leading up to the 2016 presidential 
election was to focus on racial, gender, and other sorts 
of identity-based inequalities while ignoring economic 
inequality. As a result, the Left made space for a “strong-
man” who could take advantage of and exploit a rise in 
populist sentiment. The neglect and marginalization of 
poor and working-class white people in the United States 
led those same people to turn to someone who would 
provide them with a way of achieving economic success 
rather than to deprive them of it.2 
In this paper, I generally agree with these readings of 
Rorty; he does think that the contemporary Left in 
America has made the mistake of putting class on the 
political backburner. However, I want to delve deeper 
into why it is that Rorty seems to be so preoccupied with 
class in Achieving Our Country. The obvious reason 
would be that economic inequality causes undue 
suffering, which he argues a good liberal society ought to 
minimize. However, I suggest in this paper that Rorty’s 
preoccupation with class politics in Achieving Our 
Country is in no small part a result of his view that 
economic security is vital for solidarity. Because econom-
ic security is under increasing threat in contemporary 
America, so too is solidarity. And if greater solidarity is a 
goal of liberal democracy – which, for Rorty, it is – then 
class politics, aimed at ending selfishness, ought to be as 
much a priority for the American Left as is cultural 
politics, aimed at ending sadism. Thus, even though 
Rorty speaks disapprovingly of cultural politics in 
Achieving Our Country, it is a mistake to think that 
Rorty’s call for a return to class politics in this text means 
he is uninterested in cultural politics. Indeed, class 
politics and cultural politics are connected in complex, 
mutually-reinforcing ways that Rorty worries contempo-
rary Leftists have failed to understand.  
In the first section of this paper, I provide an 
overview of Rorty’s claim that the American Left should 
                                                                       
Illing, 2019; Kilian, 2017; Metcalf, 2017; Lara 2017; Seal 
2016; Senior, 2016. 
2 Rorty’s work was also called upon in debates about 
“post-truth,” a topic I don’t consider here, but is relevant 
to debates about the role of the American Left. See, for 
example, Mendieta 2017; Read 2016. 
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return to class politics, as it’s presented in Achieving Our 
Country and supported by other writings. In the second 
section, I locate this claim in the larger context of Rorty’s 
work, and in particular in relation to two of his papers 
from the 1990s: “Who Are We? Moral Universalism and 
Economic Triage” (originally published in 1996) and 
“Justice as a Larger Loyalty” (originally published in 
1997). Relating his arguments in Achieving Our Country 
to the claims made in these two papers shows how Rorty 
thinks class politics and cultural politics are connected. In 
the third and final section of this paper, I conclude by 
showing how my reading of Rorty on class politics and 
cultural politics can blunt the edges of his debate with 
Nancy Fraser over whether redistribution or recognition 
ought to be prioritized in our theories of and attempts to 
minimize injustice. Ultimately, I argue that Rorty and 
Fraser share similar prescriptions for the American Left: 
it is time to pay attention to class again, because failing 
to do so risks the possibility of achieving our country. 
 
I. Rorty’s Call to Return to Class Politics 
 
Rorty takes on two central tasks in Achieving Our 
Country. The first is to provide a redescription of the 
history of the American Left, which he traces through 
three phases.3 The first is what he calls the reformist Left 
of the first half of the twentieth-century, including those 
thinkers of the Progressive Era, as well as “all those 
Americans who, between 1900 and 1964, struggled 
within the framework of constitutional democracy to 
protect the weak from the strong” (Rorty 1998a, 43). 
Rorty’s term, “reformist Left,” is a more capacious term 
than “Old Left,” where the latter is a term that was used 
                                                 
3 Rortyan redescriptions, it is worth noting, are never 
really an attempt to accurately represent history or a 
particular state of affairs, but an attempt to render 
salient a particular way of looking at things, rather than 
another, and to achieve certain ends, rather than others. 
Thus, criticisms that his account of the history of the 
American Left is inaccurate because it leaves out one or 
another significant moment or movement miss the mark 
insofar as they are criticisms only of the accuracy of his 
(re)description. 
by historians to distinguish early adherents to socialism 
from both the “New Left” which took over their cause, 
and early “liberals” who were not socialists. He refuses 
to buy in to a description of the American Left that sees 
some Leftists (namely liberals) as insufficiently radical to 
deserve the name. Rorty’s reformist Left, therefore, 
includes both socialists and liberals of this early part of 
the twentieth century, and is intended to break down 
the rift internal to the Left between reformers and 
revolutionaries. Both liberals and socialists should be 
recognized as having been on the same side, he thinks, 
advancing “the cause of social justice” (45). 
The second is the New Left that emerged around 
1964 in response to the Vietnam War, and includes 
people who decided “that it was no longer possible to 
work for social justice within the system” (Rorty 1998a, 
43). The New Left, made up mostly of students engaged 
with Students for a Democratic Society, “felt justified in 
giving up their parents’ hope that reformist politics could 
cope with the injustice they saw around them” (66). 
Though Rorty criticizes the New Left for giving up reform 
in favor of revolution, he recognizes that they “accom-
plished something enormously important, something of 
which the reformist Left would probably have been 
incapable. It ended the Vietnam War” (67). In so doing, 
“the New Left may have saved us from losing our moral 
identity” (68). The moral identity that the New Left 
helped save is of a country that makes peace rather than 
war.4 The civil disobedience of the New Left during the 
Vietnam era, ranging from draft resistance to protests 
that broke through police lines, shut down induction 
centers, and blocked recruiters, helped prevent America 
from becoming a garrison state – that is, a state that 
prioritizes military matters over social, political, or 
                                                 
4 Rorty writes, “The Left, the party of hope, sees our 
country’s moral identity as still to be achieved, rather 
than needing to be preserved” (Rorty 1998, 30-31). This 
is what distinguishes the Left from the Right, he thinks. 
Whereas the Left is hopeful that their vision of a better 
America can be achieved, the Right “thinks that our 
country already has a moral identity, and hopes to keep 
that identity intact” (31). 
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economic ones. When compared with the garrison state 
that America could have become were it not for the New 
Left, Rorty argues that even the “many and varied 
stupidities” of the movement are excusable (70).5  
The third Left Rorty identifies is the cultural Left, 
which grew out of the splintering of the New Left and 
now exists primarily in the academy. The cultural Left, 
Rorty thinks, emerged out of the confluence of the New 
Left’s adoption of the Marxist claim that the system 
cannot be reformed and the “widespread post-
Watergate feeling that the American government is 
hopelessly corrupt” (Rorty, Nystrom, and Puckett 2002, 
16). The cultural Left, Rorty thinks, has holed up in the 
academy and engaged, for the most part, in abstract 
theorizing that is of little help to the broader American 
Left that exists outside the academy. Though there are 
Leftists outside the academy, working as “labor lawyers 
and labor organizers, congressional staffers, low-level 
bureaucrats, … journalists, social workers, and people 
who work for foundations” (Rorty 1998a, 77), they bear 
little resemblance to the academic, cultural Left. 
Whereas the former are interested in what laws need to 
be changed in order to create a hoped-for America, the 
latter have given up on the reformists’ hope that there is 
an America worth achieving. 
One of the problems with this cultural Left, Rorty 
thinks, is that it has ignored economic inequality and 
focused on other, identity-based forms of inequality, like 
racial or gender inequality, instead. Or, to use Rorty’s 
terms, the cultural Left has been preoccupied with 
ending sadism, while forgetting to think about 
selfishness. While attempting to ameliorate racial and 
gender inequality is a laudable goal – one that Rorty 
himself has spent considerable time thinking about – 
                                                 
5 Of course, by that same measure, so too are the less 
revolutionary-minded activities and identity-based 
oversights of the earlier, reformist Left. Surely, when 
compared with the prospect of becoming a garrison 
state, even socialists must recognize that liberalism is a 
lesser evil. Thus, the animosity between reformists and 
revolutionaries is misguided, Rorty thinks, and the 
internal rift that divides them needs to be overcome. 
what Rorty laments is the fact that this focus displaced 
the focus on economic inequality. As he puts it, “It is as if 
the American Left could not handle more than one 
initiative at a time – as if it either had to ignore stigma in 
order to concentrate on money, or vice versa” (Rorty 
1998a, 83).6 So, Rorty argues that the Left needs to 
revisit the problem of selfishness by engaging in class 
politics, which it has largely abandoned as it retreated 
into the academy and turned its attention to the 
problem of sadism by engaging in cultural politics. To 
reinvigorate the American Left, Rorty thinks the cultural 
Left “would need to talk much more about money, even 
at the cost of talking less about stigma” (Rorty 1998a, 
91). However, successfully engaging in class politics 
requires leaving behind the academy and the cynical and 
hopeless attitude about America that typifies it. Thus, 
the American Left should “put a moratorium on theory” 
and “try to mobilize what remains of our pride in being 
Americans” (91-92).7 These prescriptions comprise the 
second task of Achieving Our Country. 
Why is it important to “put a moratorium on theory” if 
the cultural Left is to reengage with class politics in 
America? Rorty worries that, “in committing itself to what it 
calls ‘theory,’ this Left has gotten something which is 
entirely too much like religion” (Rorty 2007, 95). This is 
problematic because it represents a decidedly un-pragmatic 
search for the Truth of what America is and has been – a 
search that displaces efforts to improve a country in favor of 
                                                 
6 This myopic or one-dimensional approach to politics 
plagues not just the cultural Left, however. Rorty notes 
that the reformist Left was notably weak on issues of 
racial or gender inequality: “most of the direct 
beneficiaries of its initiatives were white males” (75). But 
he does think that the pendulum has swung too far in 
the opposite direction. This isn’t to say that the work of 
the academic Left has been in vain – they’ve made 
American campuses into “morally better places” (260) – 
but it has, he thinks, run its course. 
7 To these two prescriptions, Rondel adds a third: “the 
Left should abandon the ideological purity characteristic 
of Marxist revolutionaries, and adopt in its place a 
pragmatic, piecemeal, reformist attitude” (Rondel 2018, 
7). I do not identify this as a separate prescription 
offered by Rorty, but as an element of the first: if one 
abandons theory, all that is left – aside from an apolitical 
quietism – is “pragmatic, piecemeal reform.” 
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a sort of theoretical “arms race” that aims for ever-higher 
levels of abstraction. The cultural Left is beholden to the 
Truth, where the particular Truth they are interested in is 
the Truth of America as, as Rondel puts it, “both 
unforgiveable and unachievable” (Rondel 2018, 10). This is 
their “redemptive truth” a term Rorty introduces to signal 
“a set of beliefs that would end, once and for all, the 
process of reflection on what to do with ourselves” (Rorty 
2007, 90). Redemptive truth, Rorty thinks, satisfies “the 
need to fit everything – every thing, person, event, idea, and 
poem – into a single context, a context that will somehow 
reveal itself as natural, destined and unique” (90).8 Whereas 
religion used to provide this sort of redemptive truth to its 
followers, philosophy came to take on that role during the 
Enlightenment. In Achieving Our Country, Rorty’s claim is 
that the cultural Left still yearns for a redemptive truth; it 
has not been able to “kick its philosophy habit.” This 
yearning for a redemptive truth manifests in the cultural 
Left’s obsession with philosophical theorizing about 
America: “Redemption by philosophy would consist in 
acquiring a set of beliefs that represent things in the one 
way they truly are” (91). When it comes to America, the 
representation that the cultural Left has got hold of is of an 
America that is irredeemable and hopeless.  
The search for redemptive truth, and especially the 
cultural Left’s assumption that discovering the Truth of 
America through abstract theorizing amounts to political 
activity, is what Rorty calls a “spectatorial approach.” He 
writes, “These futile attempts to philosophize one’s way 
into political relevance are a symptom of what happens 
when a Left retreats from activism and adopts a 
spectatorial approach to the problems of its country” 
(Rorty 1998a, 94). By “spectatorial,” what Rorty has in 
mind is that many cultural Leftists stand back in abject 
horror of what America has done and been, and what it 
continues to do and be.9 After standing back, all that 
                                                 
8 The search for a “redemptive truth” guided much of 
Rorty’s own, early philosophical endeavors, but he later 
abandoned these efforts to hold “reality and justice in a 
single vision” (Rorty 1999, 12). 
9 Alan Malachowski provides an excellent account of 
remains to such Leftists is to “theorize” America, 
prioritizing knowledge over hope: “Hopelessness has 
become fashionable on the Left – principled, theorized, 
philosophical hopelessness” (37).  
Thus, Rorty enjoins the cultural Left to abandon its 
spectatorial approach by abandoning theory. In so doing, 
Rorty thinks it must also thereby revive hope in what 
America can become. A reinvigorated Left would have to 
reclaim the sort of pride in Amerca that animated the 
work of the reformist Left. He opens Achieving Our 
Country by writing,  
 
National pride is to countries what self-respect is 
to individuals: a necessary condition for self-
improvement. Too much national pride can 
produce bellicosity and imperialism, just as 
excessive self-respect can produce arrogance. 
But just as too little self-respect makes it difficult 
for a person to display moral courage, so 
insufficient national pride makes energetic and 
effective debate about national policy unlikely 
(Rorty 1998a, 3). 
 
                                                                       
Rorty’s political turn that is worth quoting at length. He 
writes, “Rorty claimed that we should render our 
language of progressive political deliberation banal by 
abandoning high-theoretical talk long past its sell-buy 
date. By this he meant talk, rooted in the 19th century, 
of bourgeois ideology, capitalism, class divisions, 
commodification of labour, alienation and the like. We 
should instead revive more basic, down-to-earth terms 
such as ‘greed’ and ‘selfishness’, and replace earnest 
projects of cultural criticism or Ideologiekritik – which he 
felt had begun to slip into self-parody anyway – with 
enthusiastic discussions of practical options to make a 
liberal democracy yield obviously better socioeconomic 
results within its existing institutional framework. These 
might include proposals to deal with excessively low 
wages and unemployment, provide wider access to 
better and cheaper healthcare, and improve job 
prospects along with social mobility. Though he did not 
often say it, Rorty recommended that our whole political 
vocabulary, not just that of the Left, be pragmatised. 
In recommending this, Rorty was not simply making 
one more move in the dreary game of normal politics, a 
move that could be seen (and was) as a conservative, or 
even reactionary, retreat to, or excuse for, a minimalistic 
capitalist status quo. He was trying to do for politics 
what he tried to do for philosophy: reset its common 
language to a level where it could be recognised as first 
and foremost a practical tool, a level where extraneous 
layers of theory and associated jargon no longer clouded 
the prospects for tangibly improving people’s lives” 
(Malachowski, 2019). 
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While philosophical theorizing about America is a 
symptom of hopelessness, engaging in debates about 
what America can do and become represents a hopeful 
attitude, and this hopeful attitude requires national 
pride. 
Recall that the cultural Left is not just engaged in 
theorizing; the content of the theories that inform their 
work is of an irredeemable country that is fundamentally 
racist and sexist. Thus, the cultural Left has turned to an 
elucidation of the ways that America has and continues 
to perpetrate harms against marginalized groups. Some 
theorists, when faced with this evidence, have called for 
a “politics of difference” or a “politics of recognition” 
that, on Rorty’s reading, is about recommending a 
recognition of the inherent value of different cultures, 
including the cultures of historically marginalized groups, 
like women, African Americans, or the LGBTQ com-
munity.10 However, Rorty worries that the cultural Left’s 
emphasis on “difference” and “recognition” is both 
overly theoretical and inconsistent with national pride. 
While pride in one’s identity is “an entirely reasonable 
response to the sadistic humiliation to which one has 
been subjected” (100), the problem is that this pride 
often “prevents someone from also taking pride in being 
an American citizen” (100). The politics of difference and 
of recognition is, at best, a waste of effort and, at worst, 
a distraction from and impediment to achieving Leftist 
progress. This isn’t to say that Rorty is opposed to 
movements that aim to better the lives of members of 
oppressed groups; indeed, he is anything but. But it is to 
say that he sees nothing distinct about such movements; 
they should not be seen as a “new sort of politics” (Rorty 
1999, 235).11 Rather, they “simply add further concrete-
                                                 
10 Rorty has in mind the work of theorists like Iris Marion 
Young, Judith Butler, and Nancy Fraser. 
11 In “Is ‘Cultural Recognition’ a Useful Concept for Leftist 
Politics?,” Rorty suggests that the cultural Left’s 
emphasis on the recognition of cultural differences can 
be traced to “a specifically academic set of circum-
stances” (Rorty 2000, 11). He continues, “The only thing 
we academics can do, in our specifically professional 
capacities, to eliminate prejudice is to write women’s 
history, celebrate black artistic achievements, and the 
ness to sketches of the good old egalitarian utopia” 
(235). Such movements do not give us reason to “revise, 
as opposed to supplement, our previous descriptions of 
utopia” (236). Liberalism (of the sort recommended by 
John Stuart Mill or John Dewey) is not itself altered by a 
politics of difference, he thinks; it is merely fleshed out 
in greater detail. Movements like feminism and gay 
liberation render visible forms of suffering that were not 
previously visible, thus expanding solidarity by seeing 
these sorts of suffering as worth ending and achieving a 
hoped-for America. 
Thus, rather than focusing on difference, Rorty 
wants to focus on commonality, in part for eminently 
practical reasons: “only a rhetoric of commonality can 
forge a winning majority in national elections” (Rorty 
1998a, 101). Of course, American pride does not mean 
pride in what America is, but in what it could be. He 
argues,  
 
You have to describe the country in terms of 
what you passionately hope it will become, as 
well as in terms of what you know it to be now. 
You have to be loyal to a dream country rather 
than to the one to which you wake up every 
morning. Unless such loyalty exists, the ideal has 
no chance of becoming actual (101). 
 
The dream country Rorty envisages – and the dream 
country that he thinks would best achieve the aims of 
those fighting for the recognition of marginalized groups 
– is one where differences of gender and race and 
sexuality (and so on) do not make a difference. It is one 
where “being American” is the only salient identity, and 
                                                                       
like. This is what academics who work in such programs 
as Women’s Studies, African-American Studies, and Gay 
Studies do best. These programs are the academic arms 
of the new social movements - the movements which, as 
Judith Butler rightly says, have kept the left alive in the 
United States in recent years, years during which the rich 
have consistently had the best of it in the class struggle” 
(11). He adds that academics overestimate the “impor-
tance of their own expertise” in a desperate bid to see 
themselves as relevant to progressive politics, and as 
non-complicit with the suffering of marginalized groups. 
As he puts it, “academics are desperately eager to assure 
themselves that what they are doing is central, rather 
than marginal, to leftist politics” (13). 
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where that identity signals membership in one moral 
community. Theory of the sort the cultural Left employs, 
as we’ve already seen, is not suited to this task. It 
supplies a philosophical metanarrative about what 
America is and has been; about the atrocities it has 
committed – including against its own marginalized 
groups, and indeed, its role in that marginalization – 
which are unforgivable. To take the place of the cultural 
Left’s metanarrative, Rorty recommends historically 
contingent, hopeful narratives: “The appropriate intel-
lectual background to political deliberation is historical 
narrative rather than philosophical or quasi-philoso-
phical theory. More specifically, it is the kind of historical 
narrative which segues into a utopian scenario about 
how we can get from the present to a better future” 
(Rorty 1999, 231).12  
Rorty’s recommendations to put a moratorium on 
theory and to mobilize American pride are both directed 
to a further end, namely, the reengagement of the 
cultural Left with “real politics.” A moratorium on theory 
and a mobilization of American pride are not ends in 
themselves; rather, they serve the further end of 
reinvigorating the Left by bringing together the various 
Lefts which were torn asunder by the contingent facts of 
America’s cultural, political, and economic history. By 
putting a moratorium on theory, the cultural Left will 
become more pragmatic; they will stop seeing phi-
losophy as necessary for – even definitional of – political 
engagement. They will abandon their spectatorial pulpit 
and get involved in the political tasks of changing laws 
and proposing policies. They will become agents rather 
than spectators (a distinction I return to below). By 
mobilizing American pride, those on the cultural Left will 
see that their goals are better achieved by working 
across differences to forge a national identity premised 
                                                 
12 He continues, “A turn away from narration and 
utopian dreams toward philosophy seems to me a 
gesture of despair… [W]e are now in a situation in which 
resentment and frustration have taken the place of hope 
among politically concerned intellectuals, and … the 
replacement of narrative by philosophy is a symptom of 
this unhappy situation” (Rorty 1999, 232). 
on the hope that a utopian version of the country can be 
achieved. They will stop thinking of America as an 
experiment worth abandoning, and start thinking of it as 
a project worth engaging. 
 
II. The Role of Class Politics in Cultural Politics 
 
The cultural Left, Rorty thinks, has become preoccupied 
with theoretical articulations of sadism, and it has failed 
to see how the forces of economic globalization have 
created an urgent need to focus on ending selfishness. 
Yet Rorty’s call to return to class politics shouldn’t be 
read as an admonishment to abandon questions of 
sadism, and it is a mistake to read Achieving Our Country 
this way. Rather, the two are connected in complex and 
mutually-reinforcing ways. A central reason Rorty wants 
us to talk more about class is because, without economic 
security, the solidarity he thinks is integral to a utopian 
liberal will suffer. I want to turn to a pair of Rorty’s 
papers, “Who Are We? Moral Universalism and 
Economic Triage” (originally published in 1996) and 
“Justice as a Larger Loyalty” (originally published in 
1997), to further explicate this point. 
In “Justice as a Larger Loyalty,” Rorty’s ultimate goal 
is to rid us of the traditional view that loyalty and justice 
have different sources; whereas loyalty is based on 
sentiment, justice has its roots in reason. Thus, on the 
traditional view, hard choices between preferring one’s 
family and friends over strangers is a choice between 
sentiment and reason. On Rorty’s view, however, both 
loyalty and justice are matters of sentiment. Loyalty and 
justice are therefore not differences of kind, but of 
degree. Justice simply names the loyalty we might have 
to the largest community we can imagine: all of human-
kind, perhaps, or maybe just our own religious com-
munity, or, more problematically, those of our own race. 
Since the moral community is a matter of sentiment 
rather than reason, rational insight into God’s Will or 
Human Nature cannot determine who belongs or does 
not belong to our moral community. Instead, the basis 
upon which solidarity is built is contingent; it involves 
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coming to see others as “like us” in the ways required for 
those others to be members of our moral community. 
Solidarity is created through the hard work of training 
our sympathies rather than through the recognition of 
antecedent criteria that stipulates what we have in 
common. We train our sympathies, Rorty thinks, by 
exposing ourselves to other ways of living and other 
forms of suffering. A liberal democratic culture is a 
culture that is “constantly enlarging its sympathies” and 
thereby expanding solidarity (Rorty 1991, 204).  
The task of achieving solidarity is, for Rorty, divided 
up between agents of love (or guardians of diversity) and 
agents of justice (or guardians of universality). These two 
agential roles are presented together in “On Ethno-
centrism: A Reply to Clifford Geertz” (originally published 
in 1986). There, Rorty writes,  
 
The moral tasks of a liberal democracy are 
divided between the agents of love and the 
agents of justice. In other words, such a 
democracy employs and empowers both 
connoisseurs of diversity and guardians of 
universality. The former insist that there are 
people out there whom society has failed to 
notice. They make these candidates for 
admission visible by showing how to explain 
their odd behavior in terms of a coherent, if 
unfamiliar, set of beliefs and desires – as 
opposed to explaining this behavior with terms 
like stupidity, madness, baseness or sin. The 
latter, the guardians of universality, make sure 
that once these people are admitted as citizens, 
once they have been shepherded into the light 
by the connoisseurs of diversity, they are treated 
just like all the rest of us (Rorty 1991, 206). 
 
Agents of love are engaged in what Rorty calls “cultural 
politics,” which plays an important role in achieving 
greater solidarity and involves “arguments about what 
words to use” (Rorty 2007, 3). Cultural politics incur-
porates both positive and negative projects. On the 
negative side, it includes “debates about hate speech,” 
but also “projects for getting rid of whole topics of 
discourse” (Rorty 2007, 3). Abandoning those terms and 
topics that block our ability to sympathize with others 
helps us achieve solidarity: changing our linguistic 
practices can increase “the degree of tolerance that cer-
tain groups of people have for one another” (2007, 3). 
On the positive side, cultural politics includes the 
development of new metaphors and new descriptions to 
expand logical space. New ways of speaking help “us” 
see that members of marginalized groups are not so 
different after all; in all the ways that count, these new 
ways of speaking help us see, members of these groups 
are “just like us,” and therefore deserve to be part of our 
moral community.13 Cultural politics thus involves 
imagining and articulating utopian visions. It involves 
forging solidarity around a new moral identity, where 
folks previously thought of as “them” become part of 
“us” instead. The task of cultural politics falls naturally to 
the Left, Rorty thinks, which is, “by definition, the party 
of hope. It insists that our nation remains unachieved” 
(Rorty 1998, 14). 
Agents of justice play a complementary role to 
agents of love; they are responsible for securing the 
gains made by the connoisseurs of diversity. When 
expansions (or contractions) of everyday, normal dis-
course are achieved, one of the tasks of the guardians of 
universality is to preserve those expansions (or contrac-
tions). Agents of justice (or guardians of universality), are 
responsible for ensuring that, when members of 
marginalized groups are recognized as suffering in 
particular ways that the “rest of us” haven’t seen or have 
ignored, then agents of justice ensure that those forms 
of suffering are prevented. Agents of justice include 
judges and courts who “tell the politicians and the voters 
to start noticing that there are people who have been 
told to wait for ever until a consensus emerges – a 
consensus within a political community from which 
these people are effectively excluded” (Rorty 1999, 98). 
Thus, Rorty reads court decisions as saying, for example, 
that “like it or not, black children are children too” 
(Brown) and “like it or not, women get to make hard 
decisions too” (Roe) and “like it or not, gays are grown-
ups too” (Bowers v. Hardwick, in a future reversal) (99). 
                                                 
13 I have written elsewhere in greater detail about how 
the work of agents of love proceeds. See, for example, 
Dieleman 2011; 2012; and especially 2017. 
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One of the roles of a liberal education, Rorty thinks, 
is to preserve the solidarity that has been achieved, and 
to strive to extend it as far as possible. This shouldn’t be 
read as a return to the academic Left that Rorty criticizes 
in Achieving Our Country, but rather to an education 
system that helps develop the liberal virtues.14 As 
William M. Curtis puts it, Rorty’s version of moral 
education includes “teaching stories that show how 
good things can be if people are more generous, 
tolerant, and sensitive, and also stories about ‘the pain 
endured by people who seem quite strange to us, the 
humiliation and agony they suffer when we treat them 
as badly as we are often tempted to treat them’” (Curtis 
2015, 160). These are the narratives (rather than 
metanarratives) that articulate a hopeful account of 
what American has been and could become. These 
narratives are used to nudge proceeding generations of 
students in the direction of greater solidarity. Rorty 
writes, “Producing generations of nice, tolerant, well-off, 
secure, other-respecting students … in all parts of the 
world is just what is needed – indeed, all that is needed 
– to achieve an Enlightenment utopia” (Rorty 1998b, 
179-180). 
So, the size of our moral community – the com-
munity to which we are loyal, with which we will feel 
solidarity – will depend on our ability to see “others” as 
like “us.” But notice that Rorty also mentions that the 
students we train must be “well-off” and “secure” in 
addition to being “nice” and “other-respecting.” This is 
because Rorty thinks that the community to which we 
feel loyalty will vary in accordance with our economic 
circumstances. When things get tough – when economic 
circumstances are such that we are forced to choose 
between feeding our families and feeding strangers – 
the community to which one is loyal will contract. As 
Rorty puts it,  
 
Our loyalty to … larger groups will, however, 
weaken, or even vanish altogether, when things 
                                                 
14 See also Rorty 1992, where Rorty discusses the role of 
the cultural Left in relation to education. 
get really tough. Then people whom we once 
thought of as like ourselves will be excluded. 
Sharing food with impoverished people down 
the street is natural and right in normal times, 
but perhaps not in a famine, when doing so 
amounts to disloyalty to one’s family. The 
tougher things get, the more ties of loyalty to 
those near at hand tighten, and the more those 
to everyone else slacken (Rorty 2007, 42). 
 
Rorty thinks the sorts of moral dilemmas these cases 
present are not dilemmas between sentiment-based 
loyalty and reason-based justice, but rather felt conflicts 
“between alternative selves, alternative self-descrip-
tions, alternative ways of giving a meaning to one’s life” 
(45). Do I see myself as an American first, or as a citizen 
of the world? Am I the type of person who prioritizes 
family over strangers? Are non-human animals part of 
my moral community, or will they always be subordinate 
to human members of my moral community? 
One’s ability to identify with a larger moral com-
munity – to see oneself as a citizen of the world rather 
than as just an American, for example, or to see oneself 
as part of a diverse metropolitan city rather than as just 
a community member in one’s affluent suburb – 
depends on one’s economic circumstances. To say that 
someone is a member of one’s moral community is to 
see that person as a conversation-partner, as someone 
who shares enough of one’s “final vocabulary” to make 
meaningful conversation with them possible. Our moral 
communities increase in size when the work of agents of 
love is successful, when the differences between “us” 
and “them” are rendered inconsequential, and our 
similarities become consequential. Moreover, solidarity 
with the members of our moral community entails 
coming to their aid when required. Following the 
pragmatist insight that beliefs are habits of action, Rorty 
contends that to hold a belief simply means that one is 
inclined to act in certain ways and not in others. Thus, 
“to believe that someone is ‘one of us,’ a member of our 
moral community, is to exhibit readiness to come to 
their assistance when they are in need” (13). This is 
because “Moral identification is empty when it is no 
longer tied to habits of action” (Rorty 1996, 14).  
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If we are unwilling to come to the aid of certain 
people, because they are members of a certain racial or 
ethnic group for example, then we would be lying if we 
said that group is part of our moral community, that its 
members are “one of us.” However – and this is a 
feature of Rorty’s work that has so far been overlooked – 
Rorty thinks that this unwillingness can be motivated by 
the belief that we are unable to help such people. That 
is, the moral community with which we identify depends 
on our ability to see generosity and sympathy as 
feasible. If we believe that such assistance is infeasible, 
triage is performed in the same way that nurses and 
doctors perform triage when there are not enough 
resources available to help victims of some catastrophe. 
If there are not enough resources – or even if we just 
believe that there are not enough resources – then we 
absolve ourselves, rightly or wrongly, from the obligation 
to render aid. To claim that a group is part of our moral 
community, but to fail to render assistance when that 
group requires it, renders our claim that they’re part of 
our moral community “empty” (Rorty 1996, 13). Rorty 
concludes by asserting that “thinking of other people as 
part of the same ‘we,’ depends not only on willingness to 
help those people but on belief that one is able to help 
them” (15). Thus “[A]n answer to the question ‘who are 
we?’ which is to have any moral significance, has to be 
one which takes money into account” (14). 
This suggests that selfishness and sadism can work 
together to serve the function of “othering,” where 
“othering” is understood as the process of shrinking the 
moral community, of reducing the number of people to 
whom we have a moral responsibility. Solidarity is at risk 
when folks have to choose between looking after 
themselves and looking after others. Or, more accu-
rately, solidarity is at risk when folks believe they have to 
make this choice. Thus, “selfishness,” for Rorty, can be 
best understood rather simply and straightforwardly as 
an unwillingness to help others.  
For some people in America, the belief that they are 
unable to help others will be well-founded: the 
economic position they find themselves in really does 
involve looking after themselves and their families 
because they simply do not have the means to also look 
after others. So sometimes, selfishness is justified given 
the situation that folks find themselves in. Surely it 
would be unreasonable to demand of those who cannot 
put food on their own table that they think about how 
they should be helping their broader community or 
country. And it would be wrong to hold them morally 
blameworthy for their failure to feel solidarity (in this 
more robust sense where it includes rendering aid) with 
a larger community. Such folks are responding in the 
same way any person in similar circumstances would 
respond, by looking after “their own” when times get 
tough and loyalty cannot extend beyond one’s closest 
communities. For others, even though they have the 
means to look after others as well as their own, they 
nonetheless believe that they do not. Indeed, a perverse 
outcome of a society that is characterized by vast 
economic inequality is that selfishness becomes seen as 
necessary. When there is not enough to go around, folks 
in the middle and upper classes look after their own: 
they secure a future for their own children by investing 
in private schools, and tutors, and elite colleges, without 
worrying about the educational opportunities of others. 
Economic inequality further entrenches selfishness, even 
among those who are less justified in their unwillingness 
to help others because they have the means to do so. 
Thus, Rorty’s admonishment of the American Left, I 
suggest, is an admonishment to think more carefully 
about how economic inequality threatens solidarity, and 
to develop concrete proposals for alleviating this 
economic inequality so that the unwillingness of some 
Americans to help others becomes unthinkable. 
Of course, one might argue that Rorty gets the 
problem exactly backwards. That the super-rich are 
(usually) white men who are unwilling to come to the aid 
of women and people of color is no coincidence. It is not 
selfishness, but sadism, that has created the racial and 
gendered nature of economic inequality in America; 
women and people of color are not members of the 
moral community of white liberalism in America. I don’t 
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think Rorty would disagree, at least not entirely, with 
this way of seeing things. He admits that the reformist 
Left was shortsighted in thinking that “ending selfishness 
would eliminate sadism,” and that it was a valuable 
insight to realize that sadism has “deeper roots than 
economic security” (Rorty 1998a, 76). The problem with 
focusing on sadism comes when it ignores selfishness 
altogether, and when it disavows American identity as 
worthless. Prioritizing one way of othering – sadism or 
selfishness – at the expense of the other misses half the 
picture, and renders efforts to achieve a liberal 
democratic utopia less likely to meet with success. 
Ending sadism has been a good thing for America, and 
the fight against sadism has brought us closer to 
achieving our country. But Rorty worries that the project 
of creating an American moral community – a com-
munity that “can plausibly and without qualification 
identify itself as ‘we, the people of the United States’” – 
is a project that “is losing ground” because “the gap 
between rich and poor Americans is widening steadily, 
and the latter are increasingly bereft of hope for their 
children’s future” (Rorty 1996, 11).15  
                                                 
15 Rorty writes, “We all want to facilitate alliances 
between the victims of the Republicans’ soak-the-poor 
legislation and people who are stigmatised, or deprived, 
for reasons other than poverty. The two groups overlap, 
but are not identical, and the Republicans are getting 
good at playing them off against each other” (Rorty 
2000, 18). In Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies, Rorty 
echoes this view, writing, “My feeling is that there’s be a 
tacit collaboration between right and left in changing the 
subject from money to culture. If I were the Republican 
oligarchy, I would want a left which spent all its time 
thinking about group identity, rather than about wages 
and hours” (Rorty, Nystrom, and Puckett 2000, 32). 
This idea that the Republicans are good at playing 
poor white people off against groups marginalized for 
other reasons is echoed in a recent Atlantic piece by 
Joan C. Williams. That piece opens with a quote from 
Steve Bannon, President Trump’s former strategist, from 
an interview with Prospect Magazine, where he says: 
“The Democrats, the longer they talk about identity 
politics, I got ‘em. I want them to talk about racism every 
day. If the left is focused on race and identity, and we go 
with economic nationalism, we can crush the Demo-
crats” (Kuttner 2017). Williams suggests that many of 
Trump’s “carefully timed injections of racism” were 
aimed at the Left, “in an effort to keep liberals’ attention 
Of course, just because the well-off have the means to 
render aid to more people, and therefore have less of an 
excuse for being selfish, this doesn’t mean they will render 
aid. Ought implies can, but it does not imply will. Having 
money is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition, for 
enlarging one’s moral community. This means that the 
American Left has to fight selfishness – fight the 
inclination among some Americans to be unwilling to offer 
help – for multiple reasons and on multiple fronts. The 
challenge for the Left is to make the belief that one is 
unable to help others unbelievable. For some, this will 
involve changing the economic circumstances they find 
themselves in so that they are not forced into a position 
where they have to choose between their families and 
strangers. For others, this will involve regulating behavior 
through law and policy. In both cases, these changes are 
the sorts of changes we pursue when we engage in class 
politics. They will likely involve all the usual sorts of 
measures Leftist thinkers and activists typically advocate, 
such as strengthening unions and ending precarious labor, 
alleviating student debt, strengthening the social safety 
net, universal health care, regulating big business, and 
introducing tax schemes that help the poor rather than 
the rich. At the same time, of course, it will also involve 
cultural politics so that identity-based stigmas do not 
impose arbitrary limits on who is counted as part of the 
moral community and thus is deserving of help. 
                                                                       
focused on race rather than class. If Democrats were to 
focus more attention on economic issues, they just 
might be able to win back the non-elite white voters 
they’ve been bleeding for half a century. People like 
Bannon seem to realize this” (Williams 2018). 
Nancy Fraser also remarks on the tendency of the 
Left to fall into the trap of pitting race against class. She 
writes, “Some resisters [to Trump’s presidency] are pro-
posing to reorient Democratic Party politics around 
opposition to white supremacy, focusing efforts on 
winning support from blacks and Latinos. Others defend 
a class-centered strategy, aimed at winning back white 
working-class communities that defected to Trump. Both 
views are problematic to the extent that they treat 
attention to class and race as inherently antithetical, a 
zero-sum game. In reality, both of those axes of injustice 
can be attacked in tandem, as indeed they must be. 
Neither can be overcome while the other flourishes” 
(Fraser 2017, n.p.). 
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The importance of economic security for achieving 
solidarity helps explain why Rorty finds globalization 
such a vexing topic: it puts pressures on the ability of any 
nation to achieve the liberal utopia his heroes, like 
Whitman and Dewey, envisioned. Solidarity depends on 
economic security, but economic security is such that we 
(Western liberals) have to make a choice about the 
community to which we are loyal. In “Justice as a Larger 
Loyalty,” for example, he writes,  
 
Consider now the plausible hypothesis that 
democratic institutions and freedoms are viable 
only when supported by an economic affluence 
that is achievable regionally but impossible 
globally. If this hypothesis is correct, democracy 
and freedom in the First World will not be able 
to survive a thoroughgoing globalization of the 
labor market. So the rich democracies face a 
choice between perpetuating their own 
democratic institutions and traditions and deal-
ing justly with the Third World (Rorty 2007, 43).  
 
If the task of liberalism to extend beyond the nation to a 
global polity is to be achieved, then globalization 
presents a very real challenge. Rorty asks,  
 
Do you save the working classes of the advanced 
old democracies by protectionism, or do you give 
up protectionism for the sake of the Third 
World? Do you try to keep the standard of living 
in the old democracies up in order to prevent a 
right-wing populist, fascist movement in the 
USA, or do you try to re-distribute the wealth 
across national borders? You probably can’t do 
both. I wish I knew how to resolve the dilemma, 
but I don’t” (Rorty 2002, 39-40). 
 
Though Rorty thinks that appealing to “humanity as 
such” to ground justice is wrongheaded because it aims 
to identify what is essential about human beings that 
creates moral obligation, he nonetheless aims to weave 
solidarity out of the recognition of many, small simi-
larities, and these similarities will not be limited to 
national borders. Rather, recognizing what we have in 
common with others pushes us toward a cosmopolitan 
moral outlook. 
The difficulty arises when a cosmopolitan moral 
outlook cannot be economically supported – or, if it can 
be economically supported, it currently is unclear how 
that might look. As Rorty notes, it’s a risky business to 
focus on the forms of suffering experienced outside 
national borders. Part of the problem is that the cultural 
Left, in recent decades, has been “more interested in the 
workers of the developing world than in the fate of our 
fellow citizens” (Rorty 1998a, 89). The resulting eco-
nomic insecurity experienced by a large number of 
Americans led them to support someone promised to 
protect their economic interests. This is Rorty’s 
“strongman” that received so much press attention after 
the 2016 American election. This is why the Left must 
engage in both cultural politics and class politics; they 
must work to end both sadism and selfishness. When 
selfishness is ignored, the size of the moral community 




III. Conclusion: On Redistribution and Recognition 
 
This reading of Rorty, where sadism and selfishness are 
interlocking forces that put solidarity at risk, blunts the 
edges of one of the disagreements between Rorty and 
Nancy Fraser, who typically is one of his more insightful 
interlocutors. This disagreement is part of a larger debate 
about redistribution and recognition – two mutually 
exclusive alternative understandings of the nature of and 
remedies for injustice – where Rorty sees Fraser as taking 
up the “recognition” side of the debate, and Fraser sees 
Rorty as taking up the “redistribution” side of the debate. 
As noted above, Rorty finds Fraser’s emphasis on “cultural 
recognition” to be misguided because he thinks she is 
trying to offer a new sort of politics – one that sees 
political value in emphasizing difference – where all he 
sees it doing is fleshing out the details of a less sadistic 
liberal democracy. For her part, Fraser worries that Rorty 
places too much emphasis on selfishness and not enough 
on sadism (to use Rorty’s terms), or too much emphasis 
on redistribution over recognition (to use Fraser’s terms). 
According to Fraser, Rorty – especially in Achieving Our 
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Country and “Is ‘Cultural Recognition’ a Useful Notion for 
Leftist Politics?” – takes up the redistribution side of the 
debate: he “insist[s] that identity politics is a counter-
productive diversion from the real economic issues, one 
that balkanizes groups and rejects universalist moral 
norms” (Fraser 2003, 15).16 She argues that, for Rorty, 
“the sole proper object of political struggle is the 
economy” (15).17  
It’s clear that neither Rorty’s characterization of 
Fraser’s position, nor Fraser’s characterization of Rorty’s 
position, is quite accurate. I hope I have shown in the 
preceding sections that Rorty’s account challenges the 
American Left to consider both maldistribution (arising out 
of selfishness) and misrecognition (arising out of sadism). 
Political struggle, for Rorty, involves both class politics and 
cultural politics. Similarly, Fraser thinks that the opposition 
between redistribution and recognition is a “false 
antithesis” and that subordinated groups regularly suffer 
both maldistribution and misrecognition. Thus, her goal, in 
“Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribu-
tion, Recognition, and Participation,” is to develop “an 
integrated approach that can encompass, and harmonize, 
both dimensions of social justice” (Fraser 2003, 26). In 
other words, any adequate theory of justice, as well as 
remedies for injustice, will be two-dimensional because 
they require attending to both redistribution and 
recognition.18 I also want to suggest that Fraser’s recent 
                                                 
16 According to Fraser, others who take up the 
redistributionist side of the debate include Brian Barry 
and Todd Gitlin. See Fraser 2003, 15. 
17 She places thinkers like Iris Marion Young on the other 
side of the debate, as proponents of recognition over 
redistribution. 
18 In the 1995 paper Rorty cites when he expresses 
confusion about “cultural recognition,” Fraser suggests 
that the remedy for cultural injustice “could involve 
upwardly revaluing disrespected identities and the 
cultural products of maligned groups. It could also 
involve recognizing and positively valorizing cultural 
diversity. More radically still, it could involve the 
wholesale transformation of societal patterns of 
representation, interpretation and communication in 
ways that would change everybody’s sense of self” 
(Fraser 1995, 73; emphasis in original). However, in later 
work on the same topic, Fraser argues that whether 
work commenting on American politics lays bare a 
number of similarities between her own work and Rorty’s. 
In a 2017 piece for American Affairs entitled “From 
Progressive Neoliberalism to Trump – and Beyond,” Fraser 
borrows Antonio Gramsci’s concept of “hegemony” to 
understand today’s “widespread rejection of politics as 
usual” (Fraser 2017, n.p.). All hegemonies, she claims, are 
constructed out of two essential normative components: 
distribution and recognition. Through the last decades of 
the 20th century and the first decades of the 21st century, 
American voters were forced to choose between two 
prevailing, opposed hegemonic blocs that were similar in 
terms of distribution, but differed in terms of recognition. 
Democratic Party politics represented a neoliberal politics 
of distribution and a progressive politics of recognition, 
whereas Republican Party politics represented a neo-
liberal politics of distribution and a reactionary politics of 
recognition (see table below). While voters could choose 
between a progressive and a reactionary form of 
neoliberalism, they were stuck with neoliberalism either 
way, and this neoliberalism left a “gap in the American 
political universe” because there was “no force to oppose 
the decimation of working-class and middle-class 
standards of living” (Fraser 2017, n.p.). Republican 
neoliberalism and Democratic neoliberalism left working-
class people without a political voice, thereby leaving a 
gap in the prevailing hegemony that a counterhegemony – 
one that gave a political voice to working-class people – 
could occupy.  
While the election of Barack Obama and the Occupy 
Wall Street movement presented two opportunities to fill 
this hegemonic gap, it wasn’t until Bernie Sanders and 
Donald Trump faced off in the 2015/2016 campaign that 
                                                                       
justice requires recognizing what is distinctive about 
individuals or groups, or whether it requires recognizing 
our common humanity, is something that can only be 
determined pragmatically (Fraser 1996; Fraser 2003). 
She writes, “everything depends on precisely what 
currently misrecognized people need in order to be able 
to participate as peers in social life” (Fraser 2003, 47). 
It’s not clear what motivates this change in her 
approach, but it’s clear that the latter is more amenable 
to Rorty’s own position. 
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viable populist options, which gave a politic voice to the 
working class, were presented. One option embraced a 
progressive politics of recognition and the other option a 














































After winning the election, Fraser notes, Trump 
abandoned his populist politics of distribution in favor of a 
neoliberal politics of distribution, and doubled down on 
his reactionary politics of recognition. As a result, Trump’s 
presidency represents a hyper-reactionary neoliberalism 
that is “chaotic, unstable, and fragile,” leaving the working 
class still without a political voice as the working class 
(Fraser, 2017, n.p.). Of course, this bears a remarkable 
similarity to Rorty’s prediction that the strongman elected 
as a result of American dissatisfaction with their economic 
situation would bring sadism back into style, but would do 
little to “alter the effects of selfishness” after making 
peace with the international super-rich (Rorty 1998a, 90-
91). 
Moreover, Fraser, like Rorty, claims that the economic 
inequality and insecurity created by a neoliberal politics of 
distribution leads to a breakdown in solidarity. She 
suggests that when working-class people are denied a 
political voice, when they are subject to a neoliberal 
politics of distribution that ignores and exploits their 
needs, they are condemned to “mounting stress and 
declining health, to ballooning debt and overwork, to class 
apartheid and social insecurity” (Fraser 2017, n.p.). These 
problems – problems that result from economic insecurity 
– are expressed in various symptoms, including “in 
hatreds born of resentment and expressed in scape-
goating, in outbreaks of violence followed by bouts of 
repression, in a vicious dog-eat-dog world where 
solidarities contract to the vanishing point” (Fraser 2017, 
n.p.; emphasis added). In short, the failure to address the 
economic insecurity that is produced by a neoliberal 
politics of distribution will continue to result in failures of 
solidarity. Economic insecurity breeds selfishness and 
selfishness breeds sadism. Thus, for both Fraser and Rorty, 
the American Left must address both class politics and 
cultural politics. In recent decades, the former has 
received greater attention than the latter, leading to 
failures of both distribution (manifesting in an increase of 
selfishness) and recognition (manifesting in an increase of 
sadism). It’s time for the American Left to seek a balance 
between class politics and cultural politics, so that a 
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